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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Section 129(1)(a) of the National Credit Act1
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing 
and propose that the consumer refer the credit agreement to a 
debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, 
consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that 
the parties resolve any dispute under the agreement or 
develop and agree on a plan to bring the payments under the 
agreement up to date. 
 provides that, as a required 
procedure before debt enforcement –  
 
[i]f the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit 
provider: 
 
 
Despite the use of the word 'may' in section 129(1)(a), it is clear, on a proper 
reading of section 129(1)(a) together with sections 129(1)(b), 130(1) and 130(3) 
of the NCA, that compliance with the requirements of section 129(1)(a) prior to 
actual debt enforcement in a court is mandatory.2
Section 129(1)(a) contains no indication of any time limits applicable to the 
section itself. Clarity on this aspect is, however, provided for by section 
130(1)(a), which stipulates that the consumer must be in default under the 
credit agreement for at least twenty business days and that at least ten 
business days must have elapsed since the credit provider delivered the 
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section 129(1)(a) notice to the consumer before the credit provider will be 
entitled to approach a court to enforce the agreement.3 It is submitted by Otto 
that these two periods may run simultaneously.4
(a) Was the notice contained in writing as required by section 129(1)(a)? 
  
 
Section 129(1)(a) is further silent as to the method by which the default should 
be brought to the consumer's notice. Section 130(1)(a), however, provides 
clarity by requiring the section 129(1)(a) notice to be delivered. 
 
From the aforesaid provisions it appears that a credit provider who fails to 
comply with the provisions of section 129(1)(a) prior to debt enforcement by 
means of litigation will be in a procedural predicament as the credit provider will 
not possess a complete cause of action thus, for instance, rendering the 
summons excipiable. If it is clear that the credit provider has not adhered to the 
provisions of section 129(1)(a), an exception on the basis of failure to disclose 
a complete cause of action will be upheld with the effect that the summons will 
be set aside with costs. If there was indeed compliance with section 129(1)(a) 
but merely a failure to make an allegation to this effect in the summons, the 
problem can be remedied by a subsequent amendment. 
 
The crucial question thus appears to be whether or not in a given situation one 
may say that there was proper compliance with section 129(1)(a), as this 
directly affects the existence or absence of a complete and proper cause of 
action. In order to address this question, a number of factors has to be 
considered, namely: 
 
(b) Did the contents of the notice reflect: 
(i) the consumer's default; 
                                            
3  Scholtz et al (n 2) par 12.4.3. 
4  Otto Explained 91. 
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(ii) a proposal that the consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt 
counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court 
or ombud with jurisdiction; 
(iii) that the intent of the notice is that the parties resolve any dispute 
under the agreement or develop and agree on a plan to bring the 
payments under the agreement up to date? 
(c) Did the notice require the consumer to respond thereto within ten 
business days after delivery or to indicate that it rejects the credit 
provider's proposals? 
(d) Did the notice inform the consumer that, should the consumer fail to 
respond to the section 129(1)(a) notice or reject the proposals 
contained therein and should the consumer remain in default for twenty 
days since the consumer's default commenced, the credit provider may 
elect to cancel the agreement and proceed with litigation to enforce the 
credit provider's rights under the credit agreement? 
(e) Was the section 129(1)(a) notice duly 'delivered'? 
(f) Was the section 129(1)(a) notice delivered to the correct address for 
purposes of the NCA? 
 
Compliance with (a) to (d) above seems relatively straightforward and will 
appear ex facie the notice. However, it appears that the concept of 'delivery' of 
the section 129(1)(a) notice is problematic. In this regard there seems to be 
uncertainty regarding two main issues, namely: 
 
(a) When exactly can it be said that a section 129(1)(a) notice was 
'delivered' for purposes of the NCA? 
(b) Is it necessary for such a notice to be received by the consumer in order 
to constitute proper compliance with the delivery requirement pertaining 
to section 129(1)(a)? 
 
The word 'delivery' is unfortunately not defined in the NCA, despite its being 
used in numerous provisions.5 It is, however, defined in the regulations6
                                            
5  Scholtz et al (n 2) par 12.4.4. 
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[U]nless otherwise provided for … sending a document by hand, by 
fax, by e-mail, or registered mail to an address chosen in the 
agreement by the proposed recipient, if no such address is available, 
the recipient's registered address.  
 
Further to the aforesaid, section 65(1) of the NCA provides that every 
document that is required to be delivered to a consumer must be delivered in 
the prescribed manner, if any. Section 65(2) provides that, if no method has 
been described for the delivery of a particular document to the consumer, the 
person required to deliver that document must: 
 
(a) make the document available to the consumer through one 
or more of the following mechanisms –  
 
(i) in person at the business premises of the credit 
provider, or at any other location designated by the 
consumer but at the consumer's expense, or by 
ordinary mail; 
(ii) by fax; 
(iii) by email; or 
(iv) by printable web-page and 
 
(b) deliver it to the consumer in the manner chosen by the 
consumer from the options made available in terms of 
paragraph (a). 
 
Although the NCA does not contain a definition of 'delivery' it does define 
'prescribe' as "prescribed by regulation" and it defines 'regulation' as "a 
regulation under this Act", thus having the effect that the words "in the 
prescribed manner" as used in section 65(1) appear to refer to the manner of 
delivery prescribed in regulation 1.7
With regard to section 129(1)(a) the following problematic issues arise. Firstly, 
the section itself does not specify a specific method of delivery. Secondly the 
NCA itself does not contain a definition of 'delivery' that can shed light on the 
exact meaning of 'delivery' and the closest indication to a possible method of 
delivery for purposes of section 129(1)(a) appears to be section 65(1), which 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
6  GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006. 
7  S 1. 
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appears to provide for delivery as prescribed by regulation. Thirdly, it is 
submitted that it is uncertain if one can merely regard the section 129(1)(a) 
notice as a 'document' for purposes of applying either section 65(1) or section 
65(2) to it in order to solve the problem regarding delivery. It is further 
submitted that given the serious implications of a failure to respond to a section 
129(1)(a) notice, namely that it can result in costly enforcement steps being 
taken against the consumer, two methods of service in section 65(2) militate 
against the mere application thereof to delivery of a section 129(1)(a) notice, 
namely delivery by ordinary mail (of which there would be no proof) and by 
printable web-page. The fact that the NCA also fails to define the word 
'document' obviously does not aid in this interpretational predicament. 
 
A further section that appears relevant in this context is section 96, which deals 
with the address for notice, which is also a matter on which section 129(1)(a) is 
conspicuously silent. Section 96 significantly indicates that –  
 
(1) [w]henever a party to a credit agreement is required or 
wishes to give legal notice to the other party for any purpose 
contemplated in the agreement, this Act or any other law, 
the party giving notice must deliver that notice to the other 
party at –  
 
(a) the address of that other party as set out in the 
agreement, unless paragraph (b) applies; or 
(b) the address most recently provided by the recipient in 
accordance with subsection (2). 
 
It should be noted that whereas section 65 deals with the method of delivery 
without specifying the address for delivery, section 96 deals with the address 
for delivery but does not elaborate on how such delivery must occur. However, 
there appears to be an important distinction between the two sections in the 
sense that section 65 specifically refers to 'documents' whereas section 96 
specifically refers to 'legal notice', a term that is also not defined in the NCA. 
One may consequently ask what the significance of this distinction is - was it 
drawn inadvertently or was it drawn with the intention of indicating that for 
purposes of the NCA there is a distinction between a document and a legal 
notice? One may then further ask, for purposes of dealing with the concept of 
'delivery' – does the notice in terms of section 129(1)(a) constitute a 'document', 
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thus allowing section 65 to be applied to it, or does it strictly constitute a 'legal 
notice'? This question is relevant since section 129(1)(a) specifically uses the 
term 'notice' and its mandatory pre-litigation status would justify regarding it as 
a 'legal notice'.8
(a) delivered to that person; or 
  
 
Should the point of departure be that the word 'document' should be given its 
wide and ordinary meaning, it is submitted that this 'document' can include a 
legal notice. However, if the term is understood in such a limited fashion as to 
exclude the 'legal notice' which is specifically provided for but not defined in the 
NCA, then the predicament is that the NCA does not specify the method of 
delivery of a legal notice, and section 65(1) (and by implication regulation 1) 
cannot be used to cure such defect as it can be used only with regard to a 
'document'. 
 
Another section that might possibly be considered in determining the issues 
regarding delivery of the section 129(1)(a) notice is section 168, which 
provides: 
 
Unless otherwise provided in this Act, a notice, order or other 
document that, in terms of this Act, must be served on a person will 
have been properly served when it has been either –  
 
(b) sent by registered mail to that person's last known address. 
 
Neither section 129(1)(a) nor any other section referring to it contains any 
indication that the said notice has to be served. In fact it appears that the word 
'serve' is very sparsely used in the NCA, appearing only in section 152 in the 
context of service of decisions, judgments or orders of the Tribunal. However, 
from section 168(a) it appears that service of a notice is actually equated with 
delivery. If 'deliver' refers to delivery as per regulation 1, it is strange that the 
legislature has provided in section 168 that proper service occurs if the notice, 
order or document is delivered or sent by registered post, as the latter is 
                                            
8  Scholtz et al (n 2) par 12.4.5. 
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already included in the definition of delivery. In conclusion, given that meaning 
of 'served' for purposes of the NCA appears to be no wider than that of 'deliver', 
it is clear that it is pivotally significant to determine how delivery of a section 
129(1)(a) notice should occur in order to determine whether or not there was 
proper compliance with the NCA. 
 
 
2 Facts of the case 
The problematic issue of delivery of a section 129(1)(a) notice and the question 
of whether or not such notice has to be received by the consumer to constitute 
proper compliance with section 129(1)(a) was recently addressed in the as yet 
unreported decision of Marimuthu Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd.9 The facts were that on 8 March 2006 the applicant and first respondent 
entered into an instalment sale agreement in respect of a vehicle. During mid 
2008 the applicant fell into arrears with his monthly payments. Summons was 
served on the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi and on 6 February 
2009 default judgment was granted against the applicant, including an order to 
return the vehicle.10
                                            
9  Marimuthu Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd Case no 16103/08 (KZD) (as 
yet unreported) – all references to the decision are to the typed manuscript (hereinafter the 
Munien case). 
10  Munien (n 9) par 1. 
  
 
The applicant sought rescission of the judgment and aimed at restraining the 
first respondent from repossessing the vehicle, pending the decision relating to 
the rescission of the default judgment, with the current application. The 
applicant intended to apply for rescission on the basis that he had not received 
the summons as he no longer resided at the address, and that he had a good 
defence, namely that the first respondent did not comply with section 129(1)(a) 
of the NCA. 
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In casu, the section 129(1)(a) notice was sent by means of registered post to 
the applicant's chosen domicilium.11 The applicant's argument of non-
compliance was, however, founded on the allegation that there is no street 
delivery of mail at the specific address and that the notice could therefore never 
be delivered to him.12
… letters sent by registered post to street addresses such as that 
chosen by the applicant as his domicilium would not be received 
because of the absence of a delivery service in that area.
 Wallis J formulates the primary focus of the argument as: 
 
13
The applicant argued that, keeping the purposes of the NCA in mind, the notice 
must be received by the consumer before there will be compliance with section 
129(1)(a). The argument was based on the wording of section 129(1)(b) and 
130(1) stating that enforcement proceedings may commence only after "first 
providing … to the consumer" a section 129(1)(a) notice and that the notice 
must be "delivered … to the consumer". From these extracts the inference was 
drawn that the wording of section 129(1)(a), namely "draw the default to the 
notice of the consumer in writing" means that it must be received to be 
effective.
 
 
14 The basis of the argument was that the NCA does not prescribe, 
unlike section 5(4) of the Credit Agreements Act,15 that the address chosen by 
the consumer would be the domicilium for all purposes. On the construction of 
the words quoted from sections 129 and 130 it was submitted that the notice 
had to come to the attention of the consumer to be effective.16
The respondent contended that the manner of delivery has been prescribed in 
the regulations
  Wallis J decided 
that this assumption is incorrect and reverted to subsections 65(1) and 65(2) as 
referred to by the respondent.  
 
17
                                            
11  Munien (n 9) par 3. 
12  Munien (n 9) par 4. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Munien (n 9) par 5. 
15  Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. 
16  Munien (n 9) par 6. 
17  GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006. 
 in terms of the NCA and that section 65(1) therefore applies to 
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the section 129(1)(a) notice.18 Wallis J remarked that this contention is not 
necessarily correct as regulation 1, containing the definitions, commences with 
the wording: "In these Regulations, any word or expression defined in the Act 
bears the same meaning as in the Act …". Written submissions were presented 
by counsel on this aspect, the applicant being of the opinion that the definitions 
in the regulations are not applicable and that the matter fell under section 65(2) 
of the NCA. The respondent, however, persisted that the definition in the 
regulations applied.19
The respondent based his arguments on the heading to the regulations, namely 
"Interpretation and Application of the Act". Section 1 of the NCA further defines 
the Act as including the regulations and therefore it will be absurd to conclude 
that certain methods of delivery are prescribed in terms of section 65(2) and 
other methods of delivery in terms of the regulations. Further, there are only a 
few references to the words 'deliver' or 'delivered' in the regulations and in most 
of those instances a specific manner of delivery is prescribed, rendering the 
definition of 'delivered' superfluous in those instances. Section 65, however, 
makes it clear that when a notice must be sent it must be delivered as provided 
for in the particular section, and section 65 will necessarily apply to section 
129(1)(a).
 
 
20 The respondent argued that whilst the opening wording in the 
regulations points to limited application of the definitions it must be seen in 
context, and derived therefrom that the intention was to prescribe the modes of 
delivery in terms of section 65(1).21 It was asked why the Minister would define 
delivery for the very limited purposes in the regulations only, when a greater 
need exists in the NCA itself. The respondent further pointed out that other 
expressions, such as 'auditor' and 'debt counsellor', are defined in the 
regulations but not in the NCA, and that in those instances the expressions 
carry the same meaning in both the NCA and the regulations.22
                                            
18  Munien (n 9) par 8. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Munien (n 9) par 9. 
21  Munien (n 9) par 10. 
22  Ibid. 
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Wallis J remarked that there was merit in the submissions by the respondent. 
He said that there is no reference to section 65(1) or to 'prescribed' in the 
definition of 'delivered' contained in the regulations, but that the NCA does not 
require reference to the empowering provision. He further indicated that the 
"form of a definition" is not the best manner to prescribe modes of delivery, but 
that the heading of the regulations specifically states that it is meant to be an 
interpretation of the NCA. It was thus held that the regulations contain a stricter 
mode of delivery, namely registered mail, and that there would be no reason for 
the Minister to prescribe stricter modes for "relatively minor issues", but not so 
where section 129(1)(a) is applicable, thus causing him on this basis to find in 
favour of the respondent.23
Accordingly, Wallis J decided that the manner of delivery was prescribed in the 
NCA, but the method was prescribed in the regulations as opposed to section 
65(2). He pointed out that the regulations state that a document is delivered if 
sent by one of four methods, and therefore a section 129(1)(a) notice is 
delivered if sent by registered post to the address chosen by the consumer, 
irrespective of whether or not it actually came to the attention of the consumer. 
It is thus the sending of the document that amounts to delivery and not the 
receipt thereof. He held that it is only logical that this should be the case, as it 
would be impossible for the sender to make sure that the notice had been 
received, for instance where it was sent by fax or by e-mail. In other instances 
such as registered mail, there is no guarantee that the notice would actually be 
received. Wallis J further stated that if it had been the legislature's intention that 
the notice had to be received and had to come to the attention of the consumer, 
it would have been relatively easy to expressly state it in that manner.
  
 
24
The court further indicated that its interpretation was in line with those of the 
NCA's predecessors. It referred to section 12(b) of the Hire-Purchase Act,
 
 
25
                                            
23  Munien (n 9) par 11. 
24  Munien (n 9) par 12. 
25  Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942. 
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… unless he has made written demand to the buyer to carry out the 
obligation in question … and the buyer has failed to comply with 
such demand. 
 
It also referred to Weinbren v Michaelides,26
The court pointed out that as a result of legislative amendment, it was decided 
in Fitzgerald v Western Agencies
 wherein it was decided that receipt 
of the relevant notice was necessary, whereafter the wording of the section was 
changed to read: 
 
… unless he has by letter handed over to the buyer or sent by 
registered post to him at his last known residential business address, 
may demand to the buyer … . 
 
27 that the handing over or posting by 
registered mail relieved the seller of this obligation. Subsequently in Marques v 
Unibank Ltd,28 which was decided under the Credit Agreements Act,29 it was 
also held that there would be compliance with the relevant notice in terms of the 
CAA if the notice was send by registered mail to the domicilium address.30
Wallis J considered the purposes of the NCA, but contended that they should 
not alter the plain meaning of the wording in the definition of 'delivered'. He 
stated that the question is not so much as to the policy and purpose of the NCA 
but of striking a balance between a credit provider and a consumer. A person 
sending a notice has little further control over the matter, and limited ways of 
ensuring that the notice was indeed received. A credit provider will not know of 
a change of address unless informed thereof by the consumer, and it would 
further be reasonable of a credit provider to expect that delivery of mail does 
take place at the address provided by the consumer. He also stated that the 
costs of actually ascertaining that the notice reached its destination would be 
substantial and eventually be carried by the consumer. According to him, 
nothing in section 3 is inconsistent with the interpretation that a credit provider 
 
 
                                            
26  Weinbren v Michaelides 1957 (1) SA 650 (W). 
27  Fitzgerald v Western Agencies 1968 (1) SA 288 (T) 291. 
28  Marques v Unibank Ltd 2001 (1) SA 145 (W). 
29  Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 (hereinafter the CAA). 
30  Munien (n 9) par 13. 
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fulfils the obligation of delivering the section 129(1)(a) notice if it is sent by 
registered post, fax or email to the address or number as provided by the 
consumer.31
The court thus held that the above interpretation is fatal to both the applicant's 
arguments of non-compliance with section 129(1)(a). The first argument that 
the address chosen in the agreement is not one where postal delivery takes 
place failed on the basis that the sending and not the receipt of the notice 
amounts to delivery. The second argument based solely on non-receipt also 
failed for the same reasons.
 
 
32
Wallis J held that even if his conclusion, that the regulations prescribe the 
manner of delivery, is incorrect and that the manner of delivery has in fact been 
prescribed in terms of section 65(2), the present application would still fail for 
the following reasons:
 
 
33
Section 65(2) contains two elements, the first being that the credit provider 
should make the document available to the consumer through one of the 
mechanisms listed in the subsection.
  
 
34 Secondly, the document should be 
delivered in the manner chosen by the consumer.35 The consumer will usually 
choose the manner in the credit agreement, as was the case in the present 
matter,36 where the notice was sent by registered mail to the chosen address. 
Wallis J formulates the question that needs to be answered as:37
                                            
31  Munien (n 9) par 14. 
32  Munien (n 9) par 15. 
33  Munien (n 9) par 16. 
34  S 65(2)(a).  
35  S 65(2)(b). 
36  Munien (n 9) par 18 and 19. Cl 15.2 of the credit agreement provided that: "any notice 
delivered by hand or sent by registered post to Purchaser's domicilium shall be deemed to 
have been received, if delivered by hand, on date of delivery or was sent by registered 
post, on the third day after date of posting". 
37  Munien (n 9) par 20. 
 
 
whether the fact that the notice was not received or indeed, that the 
notice could never have been received because there is no postal 
service to residences situated in that area, means that the first 
respondent did not comply with section 129(1)(a). 
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The question is answered in the negative. Wallis J held that it is not merely 
required that delivery should take place, but delivery in the manner chosen by 
the consumer. Due thereto that the consumer chooses the manner, he should 
bear the risk of non-receipt thereof. The judge remarked that the methods of 
electronic communication may be generally reliable and speedy methods of 
communications, but that it is not a given that messages sent via such a 
medium will be received. It would therefore be difficult for the sender to 
ascertain if such messages were received and to prove receipt if disputed.38
The court remarked that even though a consumer may choose for the notice to 
be made available at any location designated by the consumer at the 
consumer's own expense, it would be inconvenient to the credit provider and 
recovery of the expense may be difficult as the consumer is already in arrears. 
If a consumer is able to allege that the notice was available at the location, but 
did not come to the consumer's attention, the situation would be 'intolerable', 
and on this basis it was held that it could never have been intended by the 
legislature that the notice should come to the consumer's attention.
  
 
39
Thus it was decided that if a credit provider delivered the notice in the manner 
chosen by the consumer from the options available under section 65(2)(a), it 
would be irrelevant whether the notice actually came to the attention of the 
consumer. The consumer chooses the manner of delivery and should be 
reasonably sure that it would come to the consumer's attention. The court 
remarked that in the present case the consumer was most probably aware of 
the deficiency in the address and further should have altered his domicilium 
when he moved. He was entitled to alter his address both in terms of the 
agreement and section 96 of the NCA. He further did not inform the credit 
provider of the new location of the vehicle as is required by section 97 of the 
  
 
                                            
38  Ibid. 
39  Munien (n 9) par 21. 
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NCA, and consequently it was held that the consumer himself is largely to 
blame for the notice and summons not coming to his attention.40
Wallis J further stated that he reached his conclusion on the basis of the 
structure and language of the NCA alone, as he had not been referred to case 
law pertaining to the precise issue at hand. However, he had referred to 
decisions under other legislation or rules dealing with similar provisions. 
Reference was made to Vessels v Brink,
  
 
41
In the Vessels-case it was decided that the return of the notice as undelivered 
was immaterial as long as it was given in the prescribed manner.
 where a rule dealing with execution 
was considered. It provided that a notice 
 
… shall be served by means of a registered letter, duly prepaid and 
posted, addressed to the person intended to be served. 
 
42
Wallis J also referred to section 19(2)(b) of the Alienation of Land Act
 
 
43
(a) … 
 which 
prescribes notification to the purchaser of breach of contract prior to enforcing 
the agreement. The notice may also demand rectification of such a breach. 
Section 19(2) was quoted, which provides that: 
 
A notice referred to in s (1) shall be handed to the purchaser or shall 
be sent to him by registered post to his address referred to in s 23 
and shall contain: 
 
 
(b) a demand that the purchaser rectify the alleged breach within a 
stated period, which, … shall not be less than thirty days 
calculated from the date on which the noticed was handed to the 
purchaser or sent to him by registered post, as the case may be 
… . 
 
                                            
40  Munien (n 9) par 22. 
41  Vessels v Brink 1950 (4) SA 352 (T).  
42  Munien (n 9) par 23. 
43  Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
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Reference was also made to Van Niekerk v Favel,44 where section 19(2) was 
considered and it was decided that the requirement of notification was satisfied 
if the letter was sent by registered post, irrespective of whether it was received 
or not.45
The court remarked that even though the cases referred to are not in pari 
materia with section 65(2), it illustrates that in general when a statute or rule 
requires a notice to be given in specified ways, it is sufficient to follow the 
procedure and irrelevant whether it actually comes to the attention of the 
recipient. Wallis J decided that this approach is in line with section 65(2) 
specifically because the consumer may now choose the method by which the 
notice must be sent. He stated that even though the consumer has little 
opportunity to choose the method in standard contracts, a consumer will be 
able to change the method if not suitable. Further, the consumer has the duty to 
update the consumer's details with the credit provider should there be a change 
of address. According to Wallis J the clear intention of section 65(2) is that it 
would be sufficient for a credit provider to send the notice to the address 
provided by the consumer. Again, it would be irrelevant whether it actually 
reaches the consumer or not.
 
 
46
Even though registered mail is not one of the options listed in section 65(2), the 
court held that it remains a postal service, that the use of registered mail makes 
it more likely, not less, that the recipient will receive such notice, and thus it 
held that a notice sent by registered mail will effect compliance with section 
65(2).
 
 
47
In conclusion, it was found that the respondent complied with the provisions of 
sections 129(1)(a), 65 as well as 130, and that the applicant therefore does not 
 
 
                                            
44  Van Niekerk v Favel 2006 (4) SA 548 (W). 
45  Munien (n 9) par 24. 
46  Munien (n 9) par 25. In this regard he indicted that the fact that in the present case a 
contract of adhesion was considered does not change the situation. 
47  Munien (n 9) par 26. 
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have reasonable prospects of succeeding in an application for rescission of 
judgment. The application was dismissed with costs.48
3 Analysis 
 
 
 
3.1 Absence of domicilium provision 
The essential question that had to be addressed in casu was if a section 
129(1)(a) notice is delivered if it is sent by registered post to an address 
selected by the consumer, irrespective of if it is capable of being delivered at 
that address and if it comes to the attention of the consumer.49 The first issue 
that was raised in an attempt to answer this question, namely that the NCA 
does not contain any provision such as that embodied in its predecessor the 
CAA, which provided that an address chosen by the consumer would for all 
purposes under the CAA serve as the consumer's domicilium citandi et 
executandi,50 deserves further scrutiny.51
It can be pointed out that although the NCA does not provide in specific words 
that the address chosen by the consumer in the agreement will serve as a 
 In Marimuthu Munien v BMW 
Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd it was submitted on behalf of the consumer 
that the effect of the lack of such a provision in the NCA is that the section 
129(1)(a) notice has to come to the attention of the consumer, i.e. must by 
received by the consumer. 
 
                                            
48  Munien (n 9) par 27, 28 and 29. 
49  The Munien-judgment was approved of in the unreported Eastern Cape case of Firstrand 
Bank v Bernardo Case no 608/09, (where the court added that by virtue of the definition of 
'served' in s 7 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, 'delivery' of the s 129 notice does not 
mean that it has to be received by the defendant) as well as in the unreported case of 
ABSA Bank Limited v Kritzinger Case no 6474/2009 in the Western Cape High Court. It is 
also important to note that although certain issues pertaining to delivery of the s 129(1)(a) 
notice were addressed in ABSA Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 (2) 
SA 512 (D & CLD), the said case is distinguishable from the Munien-decision as it did not 
address the meaning of 'delivery' for purposes of s 129(1)(a) or the question of whether or 
not receipt of the s 129(1)(a) notice by the consumer is essential. In the Prochaska-case 
(on 524J-525S) the court held that when a domicilium address is chosen by the consumer, 
the credit provider must ensure that the address to which the s 129(1)(a) notice is sent is 
similar in every respect to the chosen domicilium address. 
50  S 5(4). 
51   Munien (n 9) par 6. 
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domicilium address, this is most probably only as a result of employing plain 
language,52 and the fact that the NCA aims to protect consumers who suffer 
literacy disadvantages.53 Section 96 of the NCA is most probably the provision 
that best mirrors section 5(4) of the repealed CAA. As section 65 contains no 
provision relating to an address for delivery, it is submitted that the legislature 
most probably intended sections 65 and 96 to be read together. It is interesting, 
though, that Wallis J based his proposition that the NCA does in fact contain a 
provision that counteracts the submission on behalf of the defendant (relating to 
the absence of a domicilium provision in the NCA) on the existence of section 
65 rather than on section 96. This is strange as section 65 provides for the 
consumer's right to receive documents but does not make any mention of an 
address for delivery, whereas section 96 deals specifically with the address for 
delivery of a legal notice. From section 96 it is clear that delivery of a legal 
notice should occur at the address of the party as set out in the agreement, and 
it is submitted that for all practical purposes such an address fulfils the function 
of a domicilium address, which is to facilitate delivery or service of documents, 
processes and notices. Furthermore, when one has regard to the unlawful 
provisions contained in section 90 of the NCA, no mention is made that a 
provision in a credit agreement in which an address is chosen as a domicilium 
address is unlawful. The inference would thus be that even if it can be argued 
that the NCA does not contain a specific domicilium provision, nothing in the 
NCA prevents a credit provider from specifically providing in a credit agreement 
that the address chosen by the consumer in the agreement54
It should also be noted that section 5(4) of the CAA provided that the 
domicilium address chosen in accordance with section 5(4) could be changed 
in a written communication delivered by hand or registered mail. This provision 
is mirrored by section 96(2) of the NCA which provides that a party to a credit 
agreement may change an address by delivering to the other party a written 
 will serve as a 
domicilium address. 
 
                                            
52  S 64. 
53  S 3(a). See also Scholtz et al (n 2) par 12.4.8. 
54  S 96. 
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notice of the new address by hand, registered mail or electronic mail, if that 
party has provided an e-mail address. It is ironic, however, that whereas 
section 96(1) is silent on the exact mode of delivery, and does not even state 
that it should occur in the 'prescribed' manner, section 96(2) sets out three 
different methods of delivery in respect of a change of address, thus creating 
legal certainty as to how the notice of change of address should be delivered.55
In the context of Marimuthu Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd 
though, it should be noted that the consumer in fact, in terms of clause 15.2 of 
the credit agreement with the credit provider,
 
56
It is thus submitted that the effect of regulation 1's requiring delivery of a 
'document' at the address chosen in the credit agreement as well as the effect 
of section 96(1)'s requiring delivery of a 'legal notice' at the address as chosen 
in the credit agreement is to facilitate delivery or service of documents, 
processes and notices and that, for all practical purposes, the address chosen 
in the credit agreement serves as an implied statutory domicilium address, as 
the NCA specifically obliges delivery at such address. To hold the contrary 
would be severely prejudicial to a credit provider, who would then in many 
instances have to incur extensive costs and experience severe delay in tracing 
a consumer who has left the address in the agreement without notifying the 
credit provider in accordance with the provisions of section 96(2). In certain 
 chose the address that he 
furnished in the agreement as domicilium address. Even though the agreement 
was concluded under the repealed CAA, it is submitted that such a clause did 
not subsequently become invalid as a result of the coming into operation of the 
NCA. It should further be noted that even on the interpretation that the court 
afforded the term 'delivery' as contained in section 65(1), namely that it refers to 
'delivered' in terms of regulation 1, it is required that delivery occurs at the 
address chosen in the agreement by the consumer. Thus, the choice of a 
domicilium address in an agreement does not appear to be at odds with the 
provisions of section 96, or for that matter, regulation 1. 
 
                                            
55  This despite the fact that reg 1 GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006 purports to describe 
a general method of delivery applicable in all instances. 
56  Which qualifies as a pre-existing credit agreement, as it was entered into prior to 1 June 
2007. 
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instances a credit provider may even face prescription of a claim if the credit 
provider is unable to trace such a consumer. It is thus only equitable, given that 
Wallis J held that a balance should be struck between the rights of credit 
providers and consumers,57
3.2 Application of Regulation 1 
 that the address chosen by the consumer serves 
as the consumer's domicilium address. 
 
It is submitted that the reasoning and motivation of Wallis J,58 that 'delivery' for 
purposes of section 65(1) of the NCA means that the document has to be 
delivered in accordance with regulation 1, is correct. However, as pointed out 
by Mills, the same conclusion could have been reached via a much shorter 
route provided for in section 1 of the NCA, which defines the word 'prescribe' to 
mean "prescribed by regulation".59
3.3 Receipt of delivered document 
 
 
As pointed out by Otto, the question of whether or not a document that is 
required to be delivered in terms of an NCA has to come to the attention of the 
recipient to be effective has been dealt with by our courts on various occasions. 
In Fitzgerald v Western Agencies60 it was decided that a notice sent in terms of 
the Hire Purchase Act61 was still effective provided it had been sent in 
accordance with the Act.62 However, a contrary view was held with regard to 
the Sale of Land on Instalments Act,63 in Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd, 
where it was decided that the word 'inform' in section 13 of that Act implied that 
the notice had to reach the purchaser.64 This decision was not followed by the 
court in Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd.65
                                            
57   Munien (n 9) par 14. See also s 3(d). 
58   Munien (n 9) par 9 -11. 
59  See Mills 2009 De Rebus 26. 
60  Fitzgerald v Western Agencies 1968 (1) SA 228 (T). 
61  Hire Purchase Act 36 of 1942. 
62  Otto (n 4) 89. 
 However, 
63  Sale of Land on Instalments Act 72 of 1971. The Act was repealed by the Alienation of 
Land Act 68 of 1981. 
64  Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 123 (W) 125 D. 
65  Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 314 (D) 318 E. 
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when Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd66 was taken on 
appeal,67 the Appellate Division favoured the view that the notice must reach 
the purchaser, but did not base its decision on the meaning of 'inform'. In 
Holme v Bardsley68 the court followed the position in Maron v Mulbarton 
Gardens.69 Holme v Bardsley70 was decided under section 19 of the Alienation 
of Land Act,71 which section originally also provided that the purchaser had to 
be 'informed' of the purchaser's breach of contract. However, following an 
amendment by the Alienation of Land Amendment Act,72 the word 'inform' was 
replaced with 'notify' in an apparent attempt to make receipt of the notice 
unnecessary.73
Otto consequently submitted that the decision in Holme v Bardsley
  
 
74 is wrong 
as it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule that the notice must under all 
circumstances reach the consumer.75 He proposed that the better view is that 
the credit provider has complied with the requirements of the legislation if the 
credit provider has meticulously followed the technical requirements of the 
particular section even though the notice may not reach the credit receiver.76 
The Full Bench of the Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court referred 
with apparent approval in Marques v Unibank77 to the opinions expressed by 
Otto regarding section 11 of the CCA, rejected the decision in Holme v 
Bardsley,78 and held that the notice does not necessarily have to come to the 
attention of the credit receiver.79
                                            
66  Ibid. 
67  Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 (4) SA 994 (A). 
68  Holme v Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W). 
69  Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 123 (W) 125 D. 
70  Holme v Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W). 
71  Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
72  Alienation of Land Amendment Act 51 of 1983. 
73  Otto (n 4) 90. 
74  Holme v Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W). 
75  Otto Consumer Credit par 62. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Marques v Unibank 2001 (1) SA 145 (W). 
78  Holme v Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W). 
79  Otto 2001 JSAL 169. 
 In the context of compliance with section 
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129(1)(a), Otto subsequently submitted that the court should follow the decision 
in Marques v Unibank.80
Having regard to the express wording of the definition of 'delivery' in regulation 
1, it is clear that the legislature intended the mere sending of a document in 
accordance therewith by registered post, fax or e-mail to constitute compliance 
with the delivery requirement. It can be agreed with Wallis J
  
 
81
As pointed out in paragraph 1, section 130(1)(a) stipulates that at least ten 
business days must have elapsed since the credit provider delivered the 
section 129(1)(a) notice before such a credit provider may approach a court to 
enforce the agreement.
 that the sender 
employing any of these divergent methods of delivery would have no certain 
means of establishing that the notice has been received and furthermore that, 
had the Minister the intention that the notice should be received and come to 
the attention of the consumer, a rule to that specific effect could easily have 
been formulated. 
 
82
(a) excluding the day on which the first such event occurs; 
 Section 2(5) provides that –  
 
[w]hen a particular number of business days is provided for between 
the happening of one event and another, the number of days must 
be calculated by – 
 
 
(b) including the day on or by which the second event is to 
occur; and 
 
(c) excluding any public holiday, Saturday or Sunday that falls 
on or between the days contemplated in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) respectively. 
 
As the sending of a document constitutes delivery thereof, it is submitted that 
the ten business days applicable to section 129(1)(a) will start running on the 
first business day after which the document was sent.83
                                            
80  Marques v Unibank Ltd 2001 (1) SA 145 (W). See Otto (n 4) 90. 
81   Munien (n 9) par 12. 
82  Provided that the consumer has been in default for at least twenty business days. 
83  See s 2(5) of the NCA. 
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3.4 The alternative interpretation 
In view of the decision that the definition of 'delivered' in regulation 184 applies 
to the term 'delivered' as provided for in section 65(1)(a) of the NCA, it is 
submitted that section 65(2) appears superfluous, as the method of delivery of 
a document will thus always be prescribed in accordance with the provisions of 
regulation 185 and a credit provider would not need to resort to the options 
provided for in section 65(2). However, Wallis J indicated that even if he were 
wrong in his initial interpretation regarding regulation 1 and section 65(2) did in 
fact apply this would not have availed the applicant as the consumer would 
have had the option to choose the method of delivery of the relevant document. 
The options would most likely have been dealt with in the agreement, which 
would cause the risk of non-receipt to lie with the consumer, as the consumer 
would have chosen the method of delivery. It can be agreed with Wallis J that 
should section 65(2) be applicable in a given situation, the consumer should 
carry such risk of non-receipt due to the consumer's freedom of choice. This 
opinion is sensibly motivated,86 and is also supported by Otto.87 On this 
construction, the court appears to be correct in indicating88
                                            
84  GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006. 
85  Which appears to prescribe the method for delivery generally. 
86  Munien (n 9) par 20 and 21. 
87  Otto (n 4) 91. 
88  Munien (n 9) par 22. 
 that if a credit 
provider delivered the notice in the manner chosen by the consumer in the 
agreement, and that manner was one specified in section 65(2)(a), it is 
irrelevant whether or not the notice in fact came to the attention of the 
consumer. The issue, however, still remains that, as a result of applying 
regulation 1 to 'delivered' in terms of section 65(1), it is uncertain exactly in 
which instances section 65(2) will apply. 
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4 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the NCA is clearly not an example of impeccable 
draftsmanship and the interaction between the NCA and the regulations in 
certain instances may strike one as odd, as it creates the impression that the 
legislature attempted to cure certain drafting problems in the NCA by providing 
for them in the regulations, especially insofar as definitions that one would have 
expected in the NCA are concerned.89
Given that the definition of 'delivery' in the regulations provides that it must 
occur at the address chosen in the agreement, one might also argue that it 
renders section 96(1)(a) superfluous, as the ordinary meaning of 'document'
  
 
90
                                            
89  It appears that this matter for concern has been perpetuated in the Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008, which also contains no definition of delivery but does contain a definition of 
'prescribed' as "prescribed by regulation". 
90  In the absence of a definition thereof in the NCA and regulations GN R489 in GG 28864 of 
31 May 2006. 
 
would be wide enough to encompass a legal notice. It is submitted that if 'legal 
notice' were given a restricted meaning, that would have the result that section 
96 would provide for an address for delivery of the legal notice but no method 
of delivery would be prescribed because regulation 1 and section 65(2) apply 
only to the delivery of 'documents'. It consequently leaves one with the 
impression that the legislature intended to distinguish between documents (as 
per regulation 1, which deals with the delivery of documents) and legal notices 
(as per section 96, which provides for an address of delivery of a legal notice). 
However, the method of delivery of change of address provided for in section 
96(2) is indicated in detail, appears to have general application, and is not 
restricted to applying only to the delivery of a legal notice. However, the 
inconsistency with which the legislature approaches the concept of delivery is 
clear from section 96 which, as pointed out, in itself contains three methods of 
delivery (not providing for delivery by fax) as opposed to the four methods 
(including fax delivery) provided for in regulation 1. 
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It may be agreed with Wallis J91
Apart from the fact that the consumer in casu provided a street address at 
which there was no postal delivery, it appears that he also moved from the 
address provided and failed to inform the credit provider thereof. In terms of 
section 97(2) of the NCA a consumer in respect of any goods is obliged to 
inform the credit provider of any change in the consumer's residential or 
business address in writing within ten business days after the change.
 that determining if a credit provider has 
complied with the NCA by sending a section 129(1)(a) notice by registered post 
involves answering the question of where the balance is to be struck between 
the credit provider and consumer when it comes to giving notices under the 
NCA. Because certain issues (such as whether the consumer has moved from 
the address given in the agreement or there is postal delivery at a street 
address that the consumer has provided) will usually fall within the exclusive 
knowledge of the consumer and would not be known to the credit provider 
unless the credit provider is so informed by the consumer, and because of the 
cost and time involved for a credit provider to ensure receipt of section 
129(1)(a) notices by consumers, it seems only fair that the legislature intended 
the sending of a section 129(1)(a) notice by registered post, fax or e-mail to 
suffice for purposes of the NCA. 
 
It is submitted that in the present instance the consumer's downfall was of his 
own making, as he contractually agreed, in clause 15.1 and 15.2 of the credit 
agreement, that the address that he chose could serve as domicilium citandi et 
executandi and that a notice could be delivered there by hand or registered 
post and would be deemed to have been received, if delivered by hand, on date 
of delivery or if sent by registered post, on the third day after the day of posting.  
 
92
                                            
91  Munien (n 9) par 14. 
92  Reg 34. 
 Given 
that section 96(2) of the NCA read together with section 97(2) makes it clear 
that the consumer is obliged to give notice of a change in address in a specified 
manner, it is clear that a consumer who neglects to comply with the NCA in this 
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regard cannot complain if a document, notice or summons is delivered at an 
address where such a consumer is no longer resident. 
 
Although the way in which the legislature chose to deal with the concept of 
'delivery' in the NCA and regulation thus leaves one with a slight feeling of 
unease and confusion, it is submitted that Munien v BMW Financial Services 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd has at least brought legal certainty on one aspect, namely that 
regardless of whether regulation 1 or section 65(2) applies to delivery of a 
notice in terms of section 129(1)(a), ensuring that the notice has been received 
by the consumer, which would have placed an impossibly onerous burden on 
the credit provider, is not required for purposes of compliance with the delivery 
requirement in respect of section 129(1)(a). 
 
It is further submitted that it would be prudent that a credit provider who enters 
into a credit agreement governed by the NCA, should such credit provider wish 
to provide in the agreement that the address chosen therein serves as 
domicilium citandi et executandi, should ensure that the agreement sets out 
clearly the meaning and effect of a domicilium address, given the plain 
language requirement in section 22 of the NCA. 
 
It should further be noted that, apart from the difference between the specific 
methods of delivery provided for in regulation 1 and section 65(2) respectively, 
these provisions further differ in the sense that whereas section 65(2) 
specifically gives the consumer the right to choose the method of delivery 
regulation 1 does not, and it appears that the credit provider who complies with 
regulation 1 has the option to choose the method of delivery. However, as 
pointed out by Walllis J,93
                                            
93  Munien (n 9) par 18.  
 the credit provider will usually in the credit agreement 
indicate and agree on the different methods of delivery with a consumer, and it 
would probably be prudent for a credit provider to pertinently draw the 
consumer's attention to the various possible modes of delivery. If the consumer 
then, for instance, chooses delivery by e-mail in the knowledge that he has no 
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access to a computer, the consumer will be making the election at his own 
peril. 
 
Finally, it is submitted that not all types of documents are of such a nature that 
they require service by hand or registered post as provided for in regulation 1. 
An example is a statement of accounts, which is usually forwarded to the 
consumer by ordinary post. Most probably the dichotomy between regulation 1 
and section 65(2) could be cured by amending regulation 1 and section 65(1) to 
provide for the delivery of a legal notice, thus leaving section 65(2) to provide 
for the delivery of other documents. 
C VAN HEERDEN & H COETZEE  PER 2009(12)4 
359/360 
Bibliography 
Mills 2009 De Rebus  
Mills L "National Credit Act 34 of 2005 – Section 129 notice – dispatch or 
receipt?" 2009 De Rebus August 26 
Otto 2001 JSAL 
Otto JM "Kennisgewings van ontbinding by kredietooreenkomste en 
afbetalingskope van grond" 2001 (1) Journal of South African Law 169-176 
Otto Consumer Credit 
Otto JM Consumer Credit (LexisNexis Butterworths 1996) 
Otto Explained 
Otto JM The National Credit Act Explained (LexisNexis Butterworths 
Durban 2006) 
Scholtz et al Credit Act 
Scholtz JW et al Guide to the National Credit Act (LexisNexis Butterworths 
Durban 2008) 
 
Register of legislation and government documents 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 
Alienation of Land Amendment Act 51 of 1983 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 
GN R489 in Government Gazette 28864 of 31 May 2006 
Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942 
National Credit Act 35 of 2005 
Sale of Land on Instalments Act 72 of 1971 
 
Register of court cases 
ABSA Bank Ltd v Prochaska t/a Bianca Cara Interiors 2009 (2) SA 512 (D& 
CLD) 
C VAN HEERDEN & H COETZEE  PER 2009(12)4 
360/360 
ABSA Bank Limited v Kritzinger Case no 6474/2009 (WCH) (unreported) 
Firstrand Bank v Bernardo Case no 608/09 (EC) (unreported) 
Fitzgerald v Western Agencies 1968 (1) SA 228 (T) 
Holme v Bardsley 1984 (1) SA 429 (W) 
Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 314 (D)  
Maharaj v Tongaat Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 (4) SA 994 (A) 
Marimuthu Munien v BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd Case no 16103/08 
(KZD) (unreported) 
Maron v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 123 (W)  
Marques v Unibank 2001 (1) SA 145 (W) 
Weinbren v Michaelides 1957 (1) SA 650 (W) 
Fitzgerald v Western Agencies 1968 (1) SA 288 (T)  
Marques v Unibank Ltd 2001 (1) SA 145 (W) 
Van Niekerk v Favel 2006 (4) SA 548 (W) 
Vessels v Brink 1950 (4) SA 352 (T)  
 
List of abbreviations 
CAA  Credit Agreements Act 
cl   clause(s) 
NCA  National Credit Act 
par   paragraph(s) 
reg   regulation(s) 
s   section(s) 
 
